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THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN AND THE
MOUNTAIN AQUIFER: THE
TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER
DISPUTES BETWEEN ISRAEL,
JORDAN, SYRIA, LEBANON AND THE
PALESTINIANS

ROSE M. MUKHAR·

"WAR OF BASOOS"

In ancient times, so goes the story, two neighboring tribes had
long coexisted in peace. They had shared a single well located
on the boundary of their territories. Each tribe had access to the
water from its own side to the common trough.
One day, a camel from one tribe wandered across the boundary
and drank from the wrong side of the trough. Incensed at this
breach of his tribe's sacred territorial rights, the son of the
sheikh whose realm was violated, killed the offender.
Alas, that hapless creature just happened to belong to the son of
the neighboring sheikh, who then rose in anger to smite the killer
of his beloved naaqa. There began a blood feud between the
tribes that lasted five generations and cost countless lives on
both sides. It was known as the "War of Basoos, " though no one
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remembered that Basoos, the cause of the strife, had only been
an errant camel.
When the fighting ended, neither tribe had won over the other
and both were relieved to reestablish their original sharing arrangement. Even the self-generating hatred born of reciprocal
violence could not prevail over the imperative to resolve the dispute and restore an equitable water supply to all.]

I.

DANIEL HILLEL, War of Basoos, in RIVERS OF EDEN 6-7 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
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FIGURE 1. The Jordan River ba~.
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SOURCE: Redrawn from a map of the General Staft Map Section, Director General of Milltary Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 1991.

Source: P. Gleick, Water, War & Peace in the Middle East, in 36(3)
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RGURE 2. Groundwater aquifers underlying Israel and ihe
West Bank.
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INTRODUCTION

Water has been a problematic issue for centuries in the Middle East. 2
This is explained by the fact that water has always been a scarce commodity in this region. 3 The problem is further exacerbated by the fact
that most of the waters in the Middle East are transboundary, which is
water that crosses or spans an international border.4 Indeed, the lack of
water, or access to it, has often led to serious armed conflicts. This is
reflected in the Arabic literary legend, "War of the Basoos," a long conflict over water between Arab tribes in ancient Arabia. However, that
dispute was resolved once the parties were able to reach a settlement that
represented an equitable utilization of the shared resource.
Today, achieving an equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared resource is only one of the many legal principles parties attempt to achieve
when trying to settle water disputes. Additional principles guiding settlement of shared water disputes include good faith consultation, cooperation and negotiation among the parties; prevention of significant harm
to the water resource; and, a holistic approach to the management of surface and groundwater shared resources. While trying to achieve all these
goals to avoid a potential disagreement or to settle an actual dispute may
seem idealistic and unattainable, the reality is that water is a life sustaining resource that no person or group of people can live without nor
should be denied access to. The nature and characteristics of water,
however, present unique and challenging problems in resolving water
disputes. For example, "the flow of water ignores political boundaries."5
In addition to legal6 issues, scientific, geological and environmental issues are also important in reaching a comprehensive solution, and these
create a need for an all-inclusive approach to water dispute settlement.
This study discusses the settlement of water disputes in the Middle East
and focuses on two disputes in particular relating to the Jordan River

2.
For the purposes of this study, the region referred to as the Middle East is inclusive of
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and the areas under the Palestinian Authority (PA).
3.
For the purposes of this study, the term "water" will refer to freshwater resources, such as
surface waters like lakes and rivers, as well as underground or groundwaters like aquifers.
4.
A transboundary water resource refers to "water that crosses between, or is shared by,
nations, sub-national political units, economic sectors, or interests." HEATHER BEACH, ET AL.,
TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY, PRACfICE, AND ANNOTATED
REFERENCES 3(U.N. Univ. Press, 20(0). The term "transboundary waters" will be used inter-

changeably with "international waters," "shared water resources," and "riparian waters."
5.
[d.
6.
For example, as to the "ownership" of and right to use the water.
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basin and the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank.? There is a genuine
need for an all-inclusive approach by the parties utilizing these international transboundary waters. The first dispute relates to the sharing of
the surface water of the Jordan River basin between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians of the West Bank. The second dispute
concerns the shared utilization of the ground water resources from the
Mountain Aquifer that extends from the West Bank into Israel between
Israel and the Palestinians. In addition to the already complicated issues
in any transboundary water dispute, these two disputes also involve extremely complex political and territorial issues. The history of these disputes involves, not surprisingly, both armed conflict and peaceful negotiation.
The first section of this study will describe previous efforts to resolve
these disputes, including a brief historical review of the background to,
and origin of, the disputes. The following section will outline relevant
principles of international water law, which up to now have not played a
significant role in efforts to settle these disputes. The next section discusses the two disputes in detail. Finally, the study will suggest possible
all-inclusive water settlement strategies to resolve these conflicts peacefully, consistent with the binding principles of the Charter of the United
Nations (1945),8
II.

HISTORICAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE JORDAN RIVER
BASIN AND THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER DISPUTES

Before addressing the current status of the Jordan River basin and the
Mountain Aquifer disputes, this section reviews the origins of the disputes and previous efforts to resolve them involving Israel, Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, and the Palestinians.

7.
Due to various land claims, the West Bank has been known as "Judea and Samaria," the
"Occupied West Bank," and the "Occupied Territories." In this work, the region will be referred to
as the "West Bank." A significant portion of the West Bank is autonomous from Israel's administration/occupation and is under the authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA).
8.
In particular, see art. I of the Charter of the United Nations. concluded at San Francisco,
June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, reprinted in I Weston IAI. Both Syria and
Lebanon became members of the U.N. in 1945. Israel in 1949, Jordan in 1955, and Palestine (the
PLO) received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the
General Assembly and maintaining permanent offices at U.N. Headquarters in 1974, with upgraded
status in 1988 and 1998. See U.N. Member site located at: <http://www.un.org/members/>, GA Res.
160, 43rd Sess., Dec 9, 1988, and GA Res. 250, 52nd Sess., July 7, 1998. See also the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly without
recorded vote October 24, 1970, GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess .• Supp. No. 28, at 121,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
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EARLY HISTORY

At the end of World War I, the League of Nations entrusted Great Britain
with the Mandate for Palestine, which was comprised of the areas now
referred to as the West Bank, Gaza, Israel and Jordan. 9 In 1947, Britain
announced its plan to formally withdraw from Palestine by 1948, and
requested that a special session of the United Nations (U.N.) General
Assembly prepare a study on the question of Palestine.
The U.N. Partition Plan on Palestine recommended that 54% of the land
area of the former Palestine would be allocated to a proposed Jewish
State, and the rest of the land to a proposed Arab State.lO Zionists accepted the Partition Plan, however Arabs rejected it. As hostilities and
violence rose, the British withdrew in May 1948; Israel declared itself a
State; and the fIrst Arab-Israeli war began. 11
B.

HOSTILITIES SWELL OVER WATER DISPUTES IN 1949

A year later, in 1949, with the assistance of the U.N. mediators, a formal
armistice was declared which created a demarcation line between Israeli
and Arab forces (often referred to as the "Green Line" because of the
color used on the maps):2 The new Israeli State had gained control over
most of the territory proposed under the Partition Plan, with the exception of the areas known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which respectively were under the control of Jordan and Egypt.
The frail armistice agreement focused solely on a cease-fIre, and the
post-war atmosphere was not conducive to negotiation on any issues let
alone trans boundary waters. As a result, "each of the riparians moved to
utilize the Jordan River system unilaterally."13 In 1949, Israel established
national water laws and a Water Commission to manage the nation's
water economy, and to issue licenses for tapping any source of water. 14 It
9.
UNITED NATIONS, Mandate for Palestine, in THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE
PALESTINE PROBLEM: 1917-1988,48 (1990).
10.
U.N., Report on the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine, 8/31/47, U.N.
GAOR, 2nd Sess., Supp. II, U.N. Doc. N353, vols. i-iv. See generally, U.N., THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (New York, 1994). See also, EDWARD SAID, THE QUESTION OF
PALESTINE II (Vintage Books ed., 1992). The Partition Plan also recommended that Jerusalem be
placed under the administrative authority of the U.N.
11.
Arab forces were comprised of military troops from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. See generally, supra note 10.
12.
Security Council Resolution 62 of 1948, S.C. Res. 62, U.N. SCOR, 3'd Sess., U.N. Doc

SlRES/62 (1948).
13.
MASAHIRO MURAKAMI, MANAGING WATER FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, Ch.1 (1995).
14.
DANIEL HILLEL, OUT OF THE EARTH: CIVILIZATION AND THE LIFE OF THE SOIL 246 (U.C.
Press, 1991).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

7

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 5

66

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. XII

subsequently developed a plan called the National Water Carrier so that
the waters of the Jordan River could be diverted to the coastal plains and
the Negev desert.15 The flrst part of the project was to drain the Huleh
swamps, which infringed upon the demilitarized zone with Syria. 16 This
provoked hostilities between Syria and Israel as well as the Palestinian
refugees in this area.
In 1951, Syria and Lebanon considered (but never implemented) a

scheme to divert the flow of the Hasbani and Banyas tributaries to the
Litani in the Beqa'a Valley of Lebanon. 17 In the early 1950's, both the
Jordanian Government and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) began working on separate
irrigation schemes to improve Jordanian agriculture and to resettle the
Palestinian refugees. ls By 1953, Jordan and UNWRA signed an agreement to form two dams diverting the Jordan River waters from Israel and
Syria; however, this plan did not come to fruition because Israel objected·
to it. 19 Subsequently, Israel began diverting waters at Jisr Banat Ya'qub,
in the center of the demilitarized zone with Syria. 20 Under international
pressure from the U.N. and the U.S., Israel later stopped these diversions. 21 .

C.

THE JOHNSTON PLAN

By 1954, the U.S. Government had become more intricately involved
with the water disputes. American Ambassador Eric Johnston went to
the Middle East on President Eisenhower's behalf for the purpose of
dividing the waters of the Jordan River in the West Bank equitably
among Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and IsraeP2 The Johnston Plan has since
been praised because it was able to facilitate a technical formula of equitable distribution of these waters based on the agricultural needs of each
state rather than the location of each state relative to the river.23 However, no formal agreement to this proposed regional water scheme was
reached because the Arab League rejected it on the ground that it did not
15.

Id.

MURAKAMI, supra note 13.
MUNTHER HADDADIN, DIPLOMACY ON THE JORDAN: INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND
NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, 31 (Kluwer 2(02).
18.
ALWYN RoUYER, TuRNING WATER INTO POLITICS, THE WATER IsSUE IN THE
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT 111-112 (2000).
16.

17.

Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113; see also, MURAKAMI, supra note 13.
22.
DANIEL HILLEL, RivERS OF EDEN 161 (Oxford Uniy. Press, 1994).
23.
E. Benyenisti & H. Gyirtzman, Harnessing International Law to Determine IsraeliPalestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, in 33(3) NATURAL REsOURCES JOURNAL 548
19.

20.
21.

(1993).
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provide, or even consider, the water rights of the Palestinian people who
lived within Israel's borders but remained under Jordan's rule. 24 While
this plan may have been revered for its ingenuity, today it is considered
outdated25 due to underestimated population growth, demographic
changes within the region, shifts in water patterns, altered political
alignments, and the fact that the plan failed to address the ground waters
of the Mountain Aquifer. Even so, Israel and Jordan independently
abided by the allocations prescribed in the Johnston Plan in their water
utilization of the Jordan River from 1956 to 1967. 26
D.

THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE
PROCESS

By 1956, Israel continued to utilize the West Bank's main aquifer, the
Mountain Aquifer, even though Jordan administered the West Bank. 27 In
the 1960's, Syria attempted to divert Israel's headwaters from the Jordan
River. Israel retaliated via air strikes to break the dams, and this rapidly
rising tension led to the Six Day War in 1967.28
When the final U.N. cease-fire was imposed just 6 days later, Israeli
forces had captured all the territories which had constituted Palestine
under the proposed Partition Plan, including the West Bank and East
Jerusalem from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt,
and the Golan Heights from Syria. 29 All these lands were strategic for
their natural water resources. Despite numerous U.N. resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 242, which emphasized the "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war,"30 to date no comprehensive
multilateral peace treaty has been reached among all the parties, and
there is no comprehensive treaty dealing with the water disputes.
However, by 1991, a sequence of regional events and international consequences occurred, shifting the concept of "hydro-conflict" in the Middle East to the potential for "hydro-cooperation."31 These included: the
24.

MIRIAM LoW!, WATER AND POWER 105 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995).

25.
26.

[d.
[d.; see also, BEACH, ET AL., supra note 4 at 93.
27.
HiLLEL, supra note, 14 at 245.
28.
Peter Gleick, Water, War & Peace in the Middle East, 36(3} ENVIRONMENT 10 (1994).
29.
Said, supra note 10 (recounting the history oflsrael and the Arab-Israeli wars); see also C.
HELD, MIDDLE EAST PATTERNS: PLACES, PEOPLES, AND POLITICS 171 (Westview 1994); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, General List No. 131, July 9, 2004, at 31.
30.
Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc
SIlNF/22/Rev.2 (1968).
31.
Aaron Wolf, Hydropolitical History of the River Basins, in INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF
THE MIDDLE EAST FROM EUPHRATES-TiGRIS TO NILE 36 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

9

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 5

68

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol.

xn

Intifada, or uprising, by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupied territories that began in 1987, which raised the profile of the water problems
faced by the Palestinians; a drought starting in 1988 covering the Jordan
River basin, which caused a dramatic tightening in the water management practices of each of the riparians including domestic rationing, cutbacks in agricultural use by as much as 30 percent, and the restructuring
of water pricing and allocations;32 the Gulf War of 1990; and the collapse
of the Soviet Union, causing a realignment of political alliances in the
Middle East. These developments resulted in the October 1991 Madrid
Conference, the first ever direct peace talks between Israel and Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. Since the 1991 Madrid Conference, there have been a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
as well as non-governmental academic discussions which all contributed
to the Middle East Peace Process. 33

Whereas the bilateral talks would deal with problems inherited from the
past, the multilateral track would focus on the future shape of the Middle
East. 34 The need for cooperative arrangements to foster economic development, to preserve and enhance the supply of water, and to control environmental degradation was shared by all the states in the region. The
multilateral talks also provided a mechanism for the development of bilateral relations between the Israeli Government and its Arab counterparts. Prior to Madrid, these Arab states had never participated in direct
talks or had official contacts with Israel. On the contrary, they were officially at war.
Syria and Lebanon boycotted all of the multilateral talks. However, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians all participated in "The Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources," and while this group has
had its difficulties with two absent riparian parties, it had a number of
specific achievements. For instance, not only has a wealth of expertise
and information been mobilized, but the parties, for the first time, were
able to begin the steps required to enhance and effectively jointly manage the scarce water resources of the region.35

32.
Id.
33.
S. Lonergan and D. Brooks, Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH CENTRE 212 (1994).
34.
J. Peters, Pathways to Peace, 1996 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 5.
35.
Id. at 17.
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EFFECTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS ON THE WATER DISPUTES

Progress in the bilateral and multilateral peace tracks led to the Oslo
Peace Accords,36 which culminated in a series of bilateral agreements. In
1993, there was the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements (DOP), which allowed the PLO and Israel to
formally "recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and
strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and
achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic
reconciliation through the agreed political process."37 Both parties
agreed to cooperate to establish a Water Development Program Committee to manage and develop water projects in the West Bank and Gaza,
however no specific details were set out in the DOP.38
In 1994, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty established detailed provisions
on the allocations, storage, protection and quality of water and created a
Joint Water Committee to help implement these provisions. 39 There were
additional agreements40 between Israel and the PLO after the DOP, including most importantly the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Interim Agreement).41 This agreement proposed a plan for the establishment of independent "Palestinian
institutions."42 Significantly, the parties recognized each other's rights to
water in the West Bank, and they agreed to establish a Joint Water
Committee similar to the Jordan-Israel mode1. 43 However, the Interim
Agreement stopped short of a long-term resolution on the allocation,
protection or storage of water. While the Interim Agreement and the
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty may have addressed water allocation to some
degree, overall these bilateral agreements did not resolve nor attempt to
settle the transboundary water disputes over the Jordan River basin and
36.
The Oslo Peace Accords consist of: I) Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements executed in Washington DC on Sept. 13, 1993, and 2) Letters Exchanged
between PLO Chairman Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, and Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst
between Tunis and Jerusalem on Sept. 9,1993.
37.
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note 8, Preamble.
38.
[d. at Annex m(l) & IV(2)(B-4).
39.
WATSON, G., THE OSLO ACCORDS: iNTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
PEACE AGREEMENTS, 302 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000).
40.
As in the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May. 4 1994; the Agreement
on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994; the Protocol on Further
Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 27,1995; the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment
in Hebron, Jan. IS, 1997; the Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998; and the Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and
the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations. Sept. 4,1999.
41.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28.
1995. the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO.
42.
[d. at Preamble.
43.
[d. at Annex m, art. 40(1).
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the Mountain Aquifer. Regardless of the formations and progress of the
Joint Water Committees between Jordan and Israel, and Israel and the
Palestinians, currently there has been no substantial advancement in resolving these water disputes.
Thus, in summary, the approach to resolving water disputes between
Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians initially involved the
use of armed force, and then turned to the utilization of peaceful negotiations during the 1990' s, although there has been no recent progress.
Specific international water laws have not featured prominently, if at all,
in the efforts to resolve these disputes. Yet, there is a growing body of
international water law that may point the way to a peaceful resolution.
The next section outlines these international water laws and the following two sections then review their possible application to the Jordan
River and Mountain Aquifer disputes.
TIl.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SHARED
FRESHWATER RESOURCES

It was not until after World War I that international water law began to
take shape.44 For instance, in 1929, the Permanent Court of International
Justice (P.c.I.J.) resolved the first international water dispute case related
to navigation rights of the Oder River.45 The P.C.U. relied on the concept of ensuring or protecting the "community interest" in navigable rivers based on co-existing rights so that there was an "exclusion of any
preferential privilege of anyone riparian State in relation to the others."46
Subsequently, the International Court of Arbitration, in a case involving
the utilization of a shared lake between France and Spain, stressed that
good faith consultations and negotiations were necessary prior to the
development of any water plans, not as a mere formality, but as a genuine attempt to conclude an agreement for the prevention of conflicts.47
Today, settlement of transboundary water disputes relies on these same
notions of co-existing rights and duties, based on treaties48 between state
44.
BEACH, ET AL., supra note 4 at 10. See also, Guillermo J. Cano, The Development of the
Law of International Water Resources and the Work of the International Law Commission, 14(4)
WATER INTERNATIONAL 168 (1989).
45.
See Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (United
Kingdom, Czechoslovak Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and Poland), Judgment No.
16, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23.
46.
[d. at 27.
47.
France v. Spain, Lake Lanoux Arbitration Case, Award of 16 November 1957, 12 UN REp.
lNT'LARB. AWARDS 218; 241.L.R. 101 (1957).
48.
Per the Statute of the IeJ, art. 38(1)(a) (1945), the most authoritative source of international law is international treaties (also known as conventions, charters, protocols, and statutes)
because it is a consensually binding expressed contract between the parties. See also, the Vienna
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parties (if there are any) and customary international law"9 for further
clarification. Additionally, specific bodies of international law have
been created to provide a framework for the settlement of disputes related to the utilization of freshwater and groundwater resources. However, these laws, including the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters
of International Rivers; the Seoul Rules; the Draft Articles on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses; and the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes are tenned as "soft law." That is, while these bodies
of law are not in and of themselves intended to be legally binding, they
provide evidence of customary law that helps establish what international
water law is.50 So, these bodies of law are really "guidelines for the
process of conflict resolution."51
A.

THE HELSINKI RULES

The International Law Association (ILA), established in 1873, is a nongovernmental international organization that works towards refonn and
codification of public and international law as well as the settlement of
disputes by arbitration. 52 The ILA published the Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers53 (Helsinki Rules) in 1967.
They represent an early attempt at codifying customary international law
pertaining to transboundary water resources. 54 The Helsinki Rules define
an international drainage basin, as a "geographical area extending over
two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of
waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a com-

Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, U.N. Doc. NCONF.39/27, art. 2(1 )(a) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; and, L. DAMROSCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 92
(West Group, 2001).
49.
The second source of international law is defined as an "international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law." See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 48, art. 38(l)(b). A customary international norm is compromised of both continuous and consistent State practice and
opinio juris (a State's practice based on a belief of legal obligation). See DAMROSCH, supra note 48,
at 92.
50.
Stephen McCaffrey, notes from the discussion of Fair and Just Allocation of International
Watercourses, presented at: "A Just & Peaceful World Under Law" Centennial Regional Meeting of
the American Society of International Law at Golden Gate School of Law, April 8, 2005.
BEACH, ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.
51.
INSTITtITE OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION:
52.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (2001), found at: <http://ials.sas.ac.uk/library/archiveslila.htm>.
53.
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the
International Law Association at the Fifty-Second Conference (1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules];
Repon of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers found at:
<http://fletcher. tufts.edulfacul ty/rubin/coursesn20 IIL20 1_VIIC3 _Helsinki .doc>.
54.
Gabriel Eckstein, Hydrologic Reality: International Water Law and Transboundary
Ground-Water Resources, in WATER: DISPUTE PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT 92 (American
Univ. Center for the Global South, 1998).
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mon terminus."55 They further provide that each State is entitled to a
"reasonable and equitable share" of the beneficial uses of the waters of
an international drainage basin based on "all the relevant factors in each
particular case."56
The legal definition of an 'international drainage basin' in these Rules is
significant because a river's basin is usually at the heart of a riparian
dispute. For example, the extent of the basin determines whether it spans
international boundaries and therefore which states are implicated. As
discussed below in Section IV(A), the Jordan River basin is a prime example of an international drainage basin.
B.

THE 1986 SEOUL GROUNDWATER RULES

Twenty years later, the -Seoul Groundwater Rules (Seoul Rules) were
proposed at the Sixty-Second Conference of 1l...A, to compliment the
Helsinki Rules. 57 The Seoul Rules included groundwater as part of the
definition of a drainage basin, and used the terms groundwater and aquifer interchangeably.58 The inclusion of groundwater within the definition
of a drainage basin is significant because groundwater comprises 31 percent of the total freshwater in the world, compared with 0.3 percent of
surface water. 59 Thus, the majority of disputes concerning transboundary
freshwater are over groundwater sources. These types of disputes are
complicated because the delineation of the boundaries of groundwater is
far more challenging than surface water. This is because groundwater
disperses beneath the surface, irrespective of state boundaries, and it is
hard to determine sovereignty for an aquifer. 60 Thus, while the Seoul
Rules affrrm that groundwater is subject to international water law, the
Rule's definition of an aquifer alone cannot resolve the issue of groundwater ownership.
C.

THE 1994 ILC DRAFf ARTICLES AND THE 1997 U.N. CONVENTION

The International Law Commission (ILC) was established in 1947 by the
U.N. General Assembly to promote the "progressive development of

55.
Helsinki Rules, supra note 53, art. II.
56.
[d., arts. N & V.
57.
MATSUMOTO, TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST
PRACTICES AND CURRENT IMPLICATIONS, 8 (2002).
58.
Arts. I & 2, The Seoul Rules, adopted by the International Law Association at the SixtySecond Conference Held at Seoul, Korea, 1986 [hereinafter Seoul Rules].
I. SHIKLOMANOV, WORLD FRESH WATER REsOURCES, IN WATER IN CRISIS: A GUIDE TO
59.
THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER RESOURCES, 13-24 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1993).
MATSUMOTO, supra note 57, at 3.
60.
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international law and its codification."61 The ILC studied, drafted and
then adopted the Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses (ILC Draft Articles) in 1994 after the General Assembly directed it to do so in 1970. 62 The ILC Draft Articles created the term of art: "watercourses;" defining it as "a system of surface
and underground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole."63 Thus, the ILC acknowledged the fact that
groundwater is governed by international water law as originally set out
in the Seoul Rules.
.<
In 1997, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses64
(U.N. Convention on International Watercourses), which, with modest
revisions represented the ILC Draft Articles. 65 When the General Assembly adopted the U.N. Convention on Interilational Watercourses,
member states were invited to become parties to it. 66 However, the U.N.
Convention did not enter into force because it failed to meet the required
35 ratifications, acceptances, approvals or accessions by May 2000. 67
The language of this convention is very similar to the Helsinki Rules, in
that it requires riparian states of a shared watercourse to communicate
and cooperate. 68 In fact, consistent themes from the legal instruments
previously addressed are repeated in the U.N. Convention on International Watercourses. For example, surface waters and groundwaters
must be dealt with holistically, as a "unitary whole;"69 there must be notification, consultation and consent regarding planned measures;70 there
must be an equitable and reasonable utilization of the watercourse by
riparian states;71 and, there is an obligation not to cause significant harm

61.
Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 1(1).
62.
BEACH, supra note 4, at 10.
63.
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
1994, Part I, Intro., art. 2, found at: <http://www.un.org!law/ilc/texts/nav94fra.htm>.
64.
See General Assembly Resolution 229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc AlRES/511229
(1997) [hereinafter GAOR 229).
65. Stephen McCaffrey and M. Sinjela, Current Development: The 1997 United Nations
Convention on International Watercourses, 92 A.l.l.L. 97, 106 (1998).
66. GAOR 229, supra note 64.
67.
[d.
68.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
art. 5 (1997) references "equitable participation," and states that cooperation is necessary [hereinafter U.N. Convention); See <http://www.un.org!law/ilc/texts/nav94fra.htm>; see also, BEACH, supra
note 4, at 10.
69. U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 2.
70.
[d. art. 3.
71.
Id. art. 6.
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to the watercourse. 72 These themes have particular application in the
Mountain Aquifer dispute discussed below in Section V.
Article 33 of the U.N. Convention concerns settlement of disputes, and
for the most part, this dispute settlement clause seems in line with the
principles set forth in the U.N. Charter or the Declaration on Principles
of Friendly Relations. For instance, the first paragraph calls upon those
parties to a dispute without an agreement to "seek a settlement of the
dispute by peaceful means .. .'>73 And, the second paragraph states that if
the parties are unable to negotiate an agreement, they may jointly seek
good offices services, mediation or conciliation by a third party, or utilize any joint watercourse institutions the parties have established, or they
can "agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International
Court of Justice."74
However, this dispute settlement clause has been regarded as controversial because it "provides for compulsory fact-finding at the request of
any party to a dispute."75 For instance, one of the reasons Israel abstained from voting on the adoption of the U.N. Convention was because
"the means of settling a dispute must be left to [the parties'] agreement.
Parties to a dispute must be allowed to choose the mechanism which was
most appropriate to their specific needs and circumstances."76
That said, accurate facts are clearly important in determining a state's
obligations under the U.N. Convention.77 For instance "how can a state
establish that it has sustained significant harm if the state that allegedly
caused the harm denies that it caused it or that any harm has been suffered?"78 Even though only the fact-finding commission is compulsory,
and only then if one party requests it after negotiations fail to settle the
dispute within 6 months, "any compulsory dispute settlement procedure
is bound to draw strong objections from certain countries."79 Thus, this
compulsory fact-finding clause is probably one of the reasons this Convention has not been ratified.
Because the U.N. Convention did not enter into force, it is not a binding
legal instrument. Nonetheless, Jordan and Syria both ratified this Con72.

75.
76.
77.

[d. art. 7.
[d. art. 33(1).
[d. art. 33(2).
McCaffrey, supra note 65 at 104. See U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 33(3-8).
United Nations General Assembly Press Release, GAl9248, May 21, 1997.
McCaffrey, supra note 65, at 104.

78.
79.

[d.
/d.

73.
74.
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vention and Lebanon accepted it when it was open for signature. 8o The
Palestinian Authority (PA) was not eligible to accede to the U.N. Convention because the Palestinians do not have sovereign status, and an
"international watercourse" is defined as "a watercourse, parts of which
are situated in different States."81 However, Article 32 confers some
procedural rights on non-state actors, including ensuring "access to judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim compensation or other relief
in respect of significant harm caused by such activities carried on its territory."82 Accordingly, if the Palestinians attempt judicial recourse, they
should not be discriminated against nor denied access to member States'
courts in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
The U.N. Convention was further strengthened when the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) cited to it and ruled that a transboundary water
conflict should be solved peacefully through dispute resolution mechanisms in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project. 83
D.

THE CASE CONCERNING GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT

In September of 1997, the ICJ gave its first judgment that was directly
related to non-navigable international watercourse law. It concerned a
dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the planned dams for the
Danube River, known as the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project. In 1977,
the governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia concluded a treaty
(1977 Treaty) where two dams (one in each State) along the Danube
River were to be jointly developed, constructed, financed, owned, operated, and maintained. 84 With the collapse of both communist governments in 1989, and the subsequent formation of Slovakia, Hungary abandoned the completion of the project and notified Slovakia of the termination of the 1977 Treaty.85 Slovakia insisted that Hungary carry out its
treaty obligations, and in 1992, it proceeded with its own dam project on

80.
See U.N. Convention Participants Table at:
<http://untreaty .un.orglENGLISHibiblelenglishinternetbiblelpartI!chapterXXVWtreaty4l.asp#NI >.
81.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 2, para. B.
82.
[d. art. 32.
83.
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, Sept.
25, 1997, I.C.J., General List, No. 92 [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project]; see generally the
Judgment, in panicular see paras. 155(2)(B)-(C).
84.
Hn..AL ELVER, PEACEFUL USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS
RIVERS DISPUTE, 227 (Transnational Publishers, 2002). See also the Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Budapest, Sept. 16, 1977,
1109 U.N.T.S. at 211, which articulates the project as a "joint investment."
85.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 83, para. 33.
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the Slovak territory.86 In 1993, Hungary and Slovakia submitted their
dispute to the ICJ.
The Court recognized the principle that parties to an international watercourse conflict have a "duty to cooperate" in order to achieve an equitable and reasonable resolutionY The Court heavily relied upon state obligations, rights and responsibilities based on the law of treaties. As Former ICJ President Schwebel later concluded, "international water disputes and international environmental disputes may be imbedded in
wider disputes over the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility.
Environmental norms and water norms are important, but they are not of
themselves necessarily pre-emptive or dispositive."88 The Court found
that Hungary was not entitled to abandon the dam project or unilaterally
terminate the 1977 Treaty based on the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. 89 The Court further found that Slovakia had breached the
1977 Treaty because it unilaterally assumed control over a shared resource, thus depriving "Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube.'>90
Additionally, the Court held that the 1977 Treaty "must be regarded as
establishing a territorial regime," so that the 1977 Treaty "could not be
affected by a succession of states.''91 The Court also held that the parties
were under an obligation to "negotiate in good faith in the light of the
prevailing situation, and must take all necessary measures to ensure the
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of 16 September 1977."92 To
date the parties have not yet reached a settlement, but the parties regularly inform the Court of their settlement progress. 93 The ICJ's judgment
has been called a "masterpiece" because it resolved an international
trans boundary water conflict on the basis of international law , according
to dispute resolution mechanisms found within the parties' treaty.94
In summary, there is a growing body of international water law, which
though still evolving, provides a number of principles for the settlement

86.
87.
88.
cerning

Id. para. 23.
Id. paras. 85 and 147.
Stephen Schwebel, The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case Conthe Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/slovakia), in 2002 REsOLUTION OF

INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES, THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATlONIPEACE PALACE
PAPERS 258.

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 83, para. 155(l)(A).
Schwebel, supra note 88, at 253.
Id. at 256.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 83, para. 155(2)(8).
Schwebel, supra note 88.
Id. See also ELVER, supra note 84, at 225 & 233.
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of transboundary water disputes. They include: 1) transboundary surface waters and groundwaters are subject to international water laws; 2)
there must be an equitable and reasonable utilization of water by riparian
states based upon consideration of a wide range of factors; 3) parties
have a duty to cooperate, including notification, consultation, and communication; and, 4) states have an obligation to not cause significant
harm to the watercourse.
IV. THE JORDAN RNER BASIN DISPUTE
The Jordan River basin dispute between Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon
and the Palestinians is far more complicated than the Mountain Aquifer
dispute, primarily because there are so many (adverse) parties sharing the
transboundary waters. For example, two of these parties, Syria and
Lebanon have been unwilling to date to participate in any multilateral or
bilateral talks to address the possibility of peace let alone a joint management water project. In addition to these serious obstacles, there is no
single agreement between all the riparians that covers the basin as a
whole.
In essence, the dispute concerns the amounts of water taken out of the
basin by the riparians. Israel controls the vast majority of the waters of
the Jordan River basin and utilizes the largest share. The other riparians
also utilize water from the basin, but essentially complain that Israel's
consumption is not equitable. In addition, nearly all the parties are engaged in hydro-projects that have or will have impacts on the basin.

For example, Lebanon is currently diverting water from the Jordan River
basin via the Wazzani springs between Lebanon and Israel. Lebanon
claims that it is entitled to continue pumping water from the springs under international law, and that the diversion supplies water for up to 60
villages. 95 Israel claims that Lebanon's diversion from the Wazzani
springs adversely impacts Israel's water supply, and in 2002, Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced that the Lebanon's diversions
represented a "casus belli."96 Needless to say, tensions are high over
these waters.

95.
McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined, in REsOLlITION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER
DISPlITES, THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATIONIPEACE PALACE PAPERS 55 (The Hague,
2(02). See also, N. Blanford, Heightened Israeli-Lebanese Tensions over Jordan's Headwaters,
MIDDLE
EAST
REPORT
ONLINE,
(Sept.
30,
2002)
found
at
<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero093002.htrni>.
Id.
96.
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THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE JORDAN RIVER BASIN

Figure 1 shows the geography and principal water flows of the Jordan
River basin. It starts in the north with the three headwater rivers: the
Hasbani, which begins in the Golan Heights in Syria with a small part of
its watershed in Lebanon; the Dan, which begins in Israel; and the Baniyas, which flows into Israel from the springs in the Golan Heights.
These headwaters combine into the Jordan River in Israel. The Jordan
River then flows south into and out of the Sea of Galilee. Another river,
the Yarmouk, flowing east to west, converges with the Jordan River,
south of the Sea of Galilee. Both rivers form international boundaries:
the Jordan River separates Jordan to the east from Israel to the west, and,
further south, separates Jordan from the West Bank; the Yarmouk river
-separates Jordan to the south and Syria to the north. The Jordan River
then continues south through the Jordan Valley until it eventually flows
into the Dead Sea.
B.

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

As first established by the Helsinki Rules, the basic tenet of an international water resource settlement is that all riparians are entitled to a "reasonable and equitable share" of the drainage basin.97 Today, the terminology would be slightly different but the meaning would still indicate
that each of the riparians would be entitled to an "equitable and reasonable utilization" of the Jordan River basin. 98 Thus, when reaching a settlement for these parties, "all the relevant factors in each particular
case"99 would need to be addressed, including the fact that the Palestinians - even though they have no state - are still entitled to an equitable
share because water flows through the West Bank.
Under the definitions of the Helsinki Rules and the U.N. Convention, the
Jordan River basin would be considered an "international drainage basin" and "an international watercourse." The riparians under those rules
would be Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. Each of the
riparians relies significantly upon water drains from the Jordan River
basin. Under the international water laws discussed above, none of these
parties would be permitted to act in a way that caused significant harm to
the watercourse or that disturbed an equitable utilization of the watercourse. Of course, at present, without a comprehensive agreement, each
party would argue that there is not currently an "equitable utilization."
97.
98.
99.

Helsinki Rules, supra note 53, art. IV.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 6.
Helsinki Rules, supra note 53, art. v.
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Regarding the Wazzani springs issue, Israel would argue that Articles 5
and 7 of the U.N. Convention indicate that Lebanon's diversions of the
Jordan River is in violation of international water law. It would further
argue that Lebanon's use is unreasonable and is creating inequity within
the Jordan River basin. 100 Further, Israel would contend that Lebanon has
failed in its obligation not to cause significant harm to the watercourse
since the diversion has adversely impacted Israel's water utilization.101 In
response, Lebanon would counter-argue that per Article 6, it is entitled to
an equitable and reasonable utilization of the Jordan River because it has
60 villages depending on that water resource. 102
Thus, the principal application of international water law would be for all
the parties to reach an equitable and reasonable utilization of the available water. Under the present, non-binding nature of these laws however, there is no one mechanism to compel such a result. Accordingly, a
negotiated settlement remains the only way forward under the present
legal framework.
V.

MOUNTAIN AQUIFER DISPUTE

Of the several heated contentions in the conflict between the Palestinians
and Israelis, utilization of the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank is one
of the most critical because of the scarcity of water. Since the 1990's,
the Israelis and the Palestinians have been consuming more water annually than is naturally replenished. lo3 It is estimated that Israel and the
Palestinian territories annually consume 110% of their renewable water
resources. I04 To date, there has been no comprehensive agreement (for
that matter any agreement) between Israel and the Palestinians that relates specifically to the Mountain Aquifer.
Of Israel's total annual supply of fresh water, approximately one-third is
derived from the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank.105 For the Palestinians, the Mountain Aquifer represents the primary source of fresh water in the West Bank, amounting to approximately 90% of their total annual consumption. I06 However, the Israeli government currently restricts
the Palestinians to using only 20% of the available water. 107 This is the
100.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 5.
101.
[d. art. 7(1).
102.
[d. art. 6( c).
103.
ROUYER, supra note 18, at 25.
104.
[d.
105. I. Ploss, and 1. Rubinstein, Water For Peace, 207(1l-12) THE NEW REPUBLIC 20 (Sept. 7,
1992). See also, Gleick, supra note 28, at 8; and, McCaffrey, supra note 96, at 59.
106.
Benvenisti, et aI., supra note 23, at 561.
107.
P. Feuiiherade, Israel Bargains in Bad Faith, 42(1) WORLD PREss REVIEW 38 (Jan. 1995).
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result of the Israeli authorities administering the West Bank and Gaza's
waters via military control after the 1967 Six-Day War. 108
Palestinians have, and continue to maintain, that the diversion of most of
the water from the Mountain Aquifer as well as the Jordan River has
been unfair, leaving them with minimal water resources. I09 Palestinians
claim that their rights are based on centuries of Palestinian existence in
this region prior to Jewish immigration. Israel contends that, "Jewish
settlers began exploiting this resource [in the 1920's] ... and therefore
maintain historic rights to it."11O In Israel's view, the Palestinians formally neglected this resource.
A.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER

Figure 2 shows that the Mountain Aquifer is divided into three smaller
systems: the Eastern, Northeastern and Western aquifers. The Western
aquifer flows toward the Mediterranean, and its natural drains are springs
in the West Bank and Israel. ll1 Both the Northeastern and Western aquifers are recharged from the West Bank and are tapped from within Israel
and the West Bank. However, Israel "replaced" the springs draining
both aquifers on its side of the border by hundreds of wells. 112 The Eastem aquifer flows toward the Jordan River and is replenished from the
West Bank. A small fraction of its water discharges into the Jordan
River and the Dead Sea, and a negligible amount leaks into Israel. ll3 The
rest of the renewable aquifers are replenished and can be tapped only
from Israel. They drain into both the Jordan River basin and the Mediterranean Sea.
B.

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

As the Seoul Rules affIrmed, an aquifer is subject to international water
law. 114 However as the Mountain Aquifer demonstrates, the location of
underground water (if determinable) does not itself determine groundwater ownership.
Article 6 of the U.N. Convention supports arguments for both the Palestinians and Israelis over the Mountain Aquifer dispute. On the one hand,
108.
109.
110.
111.

Gleick, supra note 28, at 36.
Benvenisti, et a!., supra note 23, at 559.
M. Keen, Whose Water is it Anyway? 231 THE MIDDLE EAST 27 (Feb. 1994).
THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, A FINAL STATUS PAPER, NEGOTIATING WATER:
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS, 7 (1996).
112.
[d.
113.
[d.
114.
Seoul Rules, supra note 58, arts. I & 2.
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Article 6 supports Israel's contention that international law protects developmental and existing uses as well as investments in water technology.115 It requires that equitable and reasonable utilization account for
"all relevant factors and circumstances, including ... population dependent
on the watercourse ... existing and potential uses of the watercourse ... conservation, protection, development and economy use of the
water resources ... "116 On the other hand, the Palestinians can argue that
Article 6 also requires consideration of such factors as "geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of natural
character ... population dependent on the watercourse ... the availability of
alternatives, or comparable value, to a particular planned or existing
use."117 These factors should balance against Israel's claims because: (i)
the Mountain Aquifer located in the West Bank helps supply Israel with
water; (ii) the Palestinian population is dependent on the groundwaters;
and, (iii) there is no other viable alternative available to the Palestinians.
Based upon the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, it is
clear that the treaties that are now in place which specifically detail a
"territorial regime" places rights and obligations on the parties that cannot be derogated from. However, there are no historical treaties between
the Palestinians and Israel that could be relied upon to determine state
responsibilities or rights.
Further, since the signing of the Oslo Accords, there has been a legal
debate questioning whether any of the peace agreements executed between Israel and the PLO are binding treaties. 118 It is argued that under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ll9 and the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,120 the treaties are not
binding because the PLO is not a state; there is no Palestinian state; and,
because the P A - which is not a signatory to any of the agreements only has limited control over some Palestinian territories (the remainder
115.
WATSON, supra note 39, at 304.
116.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 6(1)(c)(e)(t).
117.
Id. art. 6(1)(a)(c)(g).
118. See John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties? 30 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 717, 739 (1997). See also, WATSON, Are the Oslo Accords Legally Binding? in THE
OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS, supra
note 39, at 55-102.
119.
Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 2(1)(a), "A 'treaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation ... "

120.
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, entered into
force Dec. 26, 1934, 'The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter
into relations with the other states."
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of which Israel administers). Nonetheless, Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law" even though not
subject to the Vienna Convention would still be subject to customary
international law of treaties. 121 So, it can be argued that the DOP, and the
agreements executed after them should still be binding despite the lack of
formal statehood.
Finally, while there are concerns that the emergence of a Palestinian state
will further complicate the water conflict, the treaties currently in place
can "not be affected by a succession of states."122 Thus, an ICJ decision
on the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project could have
considerable impact on the resolution of these water conflicts.
VI.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

This section will briefly address some of the obstacles to be overcome
and lessons learned relating to the Jordan River basin and Mountain Aquifer disputes if sustainable peace agreements are to be achieved. A need
for joint management projects for both watercourses is described, and the
international water law framework will be applied.
A.

OBSTACLES, LESSONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW

While the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace of 1994 detailed mutually recognized water allocations between Jordan and Israel, it did not address any
of the other riparians' rights or any other aspect of the Jordan River basin
except the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers. In order for a sustainable dispute settlement to be achieved for the Jordan River basin, the agreement
must be inclusive of all the riparian parties and the parties must have a
duty to cooperate with each other per Article 8 of the U.N. Convention. 123
While the Interim Agreement recognized mutual water rights of the Israelis and the Palestinians in the West Bank, it failed to define those
rights or the waters those rights pertained to. As the Seoul Rules set
forth, any water agreement should be all-inclusive and stipulate which
waters, surface or groundwater or both, are affected by the agreement. 124
However, identifying the geography or extent of an aquifer alone does
not determine ownership or control. Therefore, the agreement must also
121.
122.
123.
124.

Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 3.
Schwebel, supra note 88, at 256.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 5.
Seoul Rules, supra note 58, arts. I & 2.
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stipulate equitable and reasonable allocations of the waters per Article 5
of the U.N. Convention.125 "First the problem of inequity must be resolved, and then the problem of scarcity can be addressed and overcome."126
One of the initial successes of the Oslo Accords was based on the fact
that a third party intervened. Norway hosted and was a facilitator to the
peace talks. The advantage of having a small, independent non-majorpower state (which was not directly involved with the dispute) host the
talks proved immeasurable because it created a "trusted environment." 127
Norway was able to provide, ftrst and foremost, "absolute secrecy" regarding the development of the talks, which played a key role in preventing the negotiators from receiving political pressure. 128 It has been suggested that without any "outside power willing to exert pressure, the
forces of compromise and democracy are crushed."129 Thus, as called for
in Article 33 of the U.N. Convention, a third party - whether it is in the
role of good offtces, mediator, or conciliator - can facilitate discussion
and help the riparian parties onto the road towards settlement. 130
B.

JOINT MANAGEMENT AND SHARING OF INFORMATION

Even with the establishment of the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA)
and the Joint Water Committee per the Interim Agreement, there is "no
common pool of reliable data on water supply, consumption, salinity
levels, recharge rates and so forth on which both sides agree."l3l The
only jointly managed water sources are those within the limited jurisdiction of the PA.l32 In fact, Israel has been reluctant for "national security
purposes" to make data public on Israel's utilization as well as the Israeli
settlers' uses of the groundwater resources in the West Bank. 133 This has
created a deep distrust by not only Palestinian water scientists and peace
negotiators, but also by academic scholars attempting to study the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. l34 Cooperation and information exchange among
the users of this precious resource is crucial if peace is ever to be established and maintained. Joint management of shared water resources is
125.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, art. 8.
126.
ROUYER, supra note 18, at 278.
127.
DEINIOL JONES, COSMOPOLITAN MEDIATION? CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE OSLO
ACCORDS 107 (Manchester Univ. Press, 1999).
128.
[d. at 112.
129.
[d. at 150.
130.
U.N. Convention, supra note 68, Article 33(2).
131.
ROUYER, supra note 18, at 15.
132.
[d. at 257.
133.
[d. at 16.
134.
[d. at 17.
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not an uncommon occurrence. International regimes gov~rn the development and utilization of many of the major watercourses of the world,
including the U.S. - Canada International Joint Commission regarding
management of the Great Lakes I35 as well as the Nile Basin Initiative. 136
Further, Article 24 of the U.N. Convention requires that all watercourse
states enter into consultation over joint mechanisms if any riparian state
requests it. 137 Finally, there have been model international commissions
proposed, including a joint Israeli-Palestinian research team that suggested a gradual formation of a joint water management system to build
confidence and experience. 138
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a long history of water-related disputes in the Middle East region, from conflicts over access to adequate water supplies to intentional
attacks on water systems during wars. The characteristics that make water likely to be a source of strategic rivalry are: the degree of its scarcity,
the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one party or
state, the relative power of the parties concerned, and the ease of access
to alternative fresh water resources. 139
Israel controls virtually all of the Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer's major water resources, it has overpowering military superiority
compared to its Arab neighbors, and it appears reluctant to yield significant portions (if any) of the territories it presently holds. So, the question
remains: what incentives or power can the Palestinians and the Arab
states use, individually or collectively, to persuade the Israeli government to accept substantial territorial and political changes in the status
quo?
The most strategic option for the Arab states of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,
as well as the Palestinians would be to press forward with the negotiations with the aid of the international community. Though there has been
a stall in the peace track, it is apparent that the Jordanians and the Pales135.
ELVER, supra note 84, at 209.
136.
The Nile River basin has 10 riparians, and there have been disputes between Egypt, Sudan
and Ethiopia over water allocations. However, with the formation of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
there have been efforts by all riparians to develop projects of mutual benefit, and it is believed they
might formalize a "basin-wide agreement containing principles and obligations, and establishing a
permanent joint institution." McCaffrey, supra note 96, at 59.
137.
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138.
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139.
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tinians are committed to negotiating with the Israelis concerning their
common water resources. In this regard, the international water law
framework offers guidance to what the parties should strive for: a detailed agreement that reflects the needs of all the riparian parties in order
to achieve an equitable and reasonable utilization of the waters. The
time may come when these principles become legally binding customary
international law. Until then, international pressure and assistance can
and should be brought to bear to facilitate renewed discussions and creative thinking. This is the only realistic option for the Arab parties since
they do not share Israel's hydro-strategic location, nor do they possess
the military strength to countervail Israel's power.
An additional factor that furthers the need for cooperation is that the limited water resources in the region are diminishing at a faster rate than can
be replenished due to the significant (and projected) increase in the Palestinian and Israeli populations. This factor, coupled with the increasing
demands on the individual economies of the parties to the Arab-Israeli
conflict, has intensified the need for cooperation to avoid the high costs
of wars.
Prospects for peace between the Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the
Palestinians demand that a new approach to policymaking and planning
be addressed, so that equitable and reasonable water utilization can be
achieved by all the riparians. However, the existence of disputes in the
region unrelated to water makes the resolution of water disputes much
harder to achieve, since they can rarely be dealt with in isolation. Therefore, cooperation in issues related to water resources will be dependent
on both bilateral and multilateral specific international agreements. In
other words, such cooperation must be secured by peace agreements.
This condition arises because individual water rights continue to be regulated by states. All parties to the Jordan River basin and the Mountain
Aquifer ought to participate in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as
well as use the input of specialists and scholars, and the international
community in order to achieve a genuine and lasting resolution to the
conflicts.
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